Kindle
$16.99
Available instantly
Audible Logo Audiobook
$0.00
with membership trial
Hardcover
$27.51
Paperback
$18.78
Kindle Price: $16.99

Save $18.01 (51%)

Promotions apply when you purchase

These promotions will be applied to this item:

Some promotions may be combined; others are not eligible to be combined with other offers. For details, please see the Terms & Conditions associated with these promotions.

Audiobook Price: $22.57

Save: $15.08 (67%)

Read with our free app
You've subscribed to ! We will preorder your items within 24 hours of when they become available. When new books are released, we'll charge your default payment method for the lowest price available during the pre-order period.
Update your device or payment method, cancel individual pre-orders or your subscription at
Your Memberships & Subscriptions

Buy for others

Give as a gift or purchase for a team or group.
Learn more

Buying and sending eBooks to others

  1. Select quantity
  2. Buy and send eBooks
  3. Recipients can read on any device

These ebooks can only be redeemed by recipients in the US. Redemption links and eBooks cannot be resold.
Kindle app logo image

Download the free Kindle app and start reading Kindle books instantly on your smartphone, tablet, or computer - no Kindle device required.

Read instantly on your browser with Kindle for Web.

Using your mobile phone camera - scan the code below and download the Kindle app.

QR code to download the Kindle App

Amazon book clubs early access
Loading your book clubs
There was a problem loading your book clubs. Please try again.
Not in a club? Learn more
Amazon book clubs early access

Join or create book clubs

Choose books together

Track your books
Bring your club to Amazon Book Clubs, start a new book club and invite your friends to join, or find a club that’s right for you for free.
Explore Amazon Book Clubs

Follow the authors

Mary E. Sarotte
Follow
M. E. Sarotte
Follow
Something went wrong. Please try your request again later.

Not One Inch: America, Russia, and the Making of Post-Cold War Stalemate (The Henry L. Stimson Lectures Series) Kindle Edition

by M. E. Sarotte (Author) Format: Kindle Edition
4.7 4.7 out of 5 stars 373 ratings
See all formats and editions
Great on Kindle
Great Experience. Great Value.
iphone with kindle app
Putting our best book forward
Each Great on Kindle book offers a great reading experience, at a better value than print to keep your wallet happy.

Explore your book, then jump right back to where you left off with Page Flip.

View high quality images that let you zoom in to take a closer look.

Enjoy features only possible in digital – start reading right away, carry your library with you, adjust the font, create shareable notes and highlights, and more.

Discover additional details about the events, people, and places in your book, with Wikipedia integration.
Get the free Kindle app: Link to the kindle app page Link to the kindle app page
Enjoy a great reading experience when you buy the Kindle edition of this book. Learn more about Great on Kindle, available in select categories.
Thirty years after the Soviet Union’s collapse, this book reveals how tensions between America, NATO, and Russia transformed geopolitics in the decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall



“The most engaging and carefully documented account of this period in East-West diplomacy currently available.”—Andrew Moravscik, Foreign Affairs



Not one inch. With these words, Secretary of State James Baker proposed a hypothetical bargain to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev after the fall of the Berlin Wall: if you let your part of Germany go, we will move NATO not one inch eastward. Controversy erupted almost immediately over this 1990 exchange—but more important was the decade to come, when the words took on new meaning. Gorbachev let his Germany go, but Washington rethought the bargain, not least after the Soviet Union’s own collapse in December 1991. Washington realized it could not just win big but win bigger. Not one inch of territory needed to be off limits to NATO.



On the thirtieth anniversary of the Soviet collapse, this book uses new evidence and interviews to show how, in the decade that culminated in Vladimir Putin’s rise to power, the United States and Russia undermined a potentially lasting partnership. Prize-winning historian M. E. Sarotte shows what went wrong.
Previous page
  1. Part of series
    The Henry L. Stimson Lectures Series
  2. Print length
    567 pages
  3. Language
    English
  4. Sticky notes
    On Kindle Scribe
  5. Publisher
    Yale University Press
  6. Publication date
    November 30, 2021
  7. File size
    9028 KB
  8. Page Flip
    Enabled
  9. Word Wise
    Enabled
  10. Enhanced typesetting
    Enabled
  11. See all details
Next page
All 8 for you in this series See full series
See included books
Total Price: $127.03
By clicking on above button, you agree to the Kindle Store Terms of Use
More like Not One Inch: America, Russia, and the Making of Post-Cold War Stalemate (The Henry L. Stimson Lectures Series)
Page 1 of 1Start overPage 1 of 1
Previous page
  5. A Brief Guide to Maritime Strategy
    Kindle Edition
    $14.55
  11. The Ukraine War & the Eurasian World Order
    Kindle Edition
    Just released
    $14.99
  16. Ukraine and the Art of Strategy
    Kindle Edition
    $14.74
  18. Putin
    Kindle Edition
    Editors' pick
    $12.99
Next page
Loading...

Editorial Reviews

Review

“Sarotte has the receipts, as it were: her authoritative tale draws on thousands of memos, letters, briefs, and other once secret documents—including many that have never been published before—which both fill in and complicate settled narratives on both sides.”—Joshua Yaffa, New Yorker

“Prize-winning historian Mary Elise Sarotte . . . charts all the private discussions within the western alliance and with Russia over enlargement and reveals Russia as powerless to slow the ratchet effect of the opening of Nato’s door.”—Patrick Wintour, The Guardian

“Sarotte is the unofficial dean of ‘end of Cold War’ studies. . . . With her latest book, she tackles head-on the not-controversial-at-all questions about NATO’s eastward growth and the effect it had on Russia’s relations with the west. I look forward to the contretemps this book will inevitably produce.”—Daniel W. Drezner, Washington Post

“‘Not one inch to the east’ . . . [is] a history so often repeated that it’s practically conventional wisdom. Mary Sarotte . . . [describes] what actually happened [between the US and Russia], and how both the reality and distortion really shape today’s events.”—Max Fisher, New York Times, from “The Interpreter” newsletter

“A riveting account of Nato enlargement and its contribution to the present confrontation. Sarotte tells the story with great narrative and analytical flair, admirable objectivity, and an attention to detail that many of us who thought we knew the history have forgotten or never knew.”—Rodric Braithwaite, Financial Times

“Masterful and exhaustively researched . . . For this well-written and pacy book, [Sarotte] has uncovered previously unpublished details of former president Bill Clinton’s role in deciding Europe’s fate.”—Con Coughlin, Sunday Telegraph

“Highly detailed, thoroughly researched, and briskly written.”—Fred Kaplan, New York Review of Books

“There’s no one who has researched the relevant sources more thoroughly than historian Mary E. Sarotte, who has just published Not One Inch . . . successfully reconstructing the most significant days [in NATO expansion].”—Stefan Kornelius, Süddeutsche Zeitung

“Sarotte weaves together the most engaging and carefully documented account of this period in East-West diplomacy currently available.”—Andrew Moravcsik, Foreign Affairs

Selected as a Foreign Affairs Best Book of 2021

“A tour de force of research and analysis.”—Richard Aldous, host of American Purpose’s “Bookstack” podcast

“A must-read for anyone interested in U.S.-Russian relations or the study of U.S. foreign policy since 1991.”—Emma Ashford, War on the Rocks

“[A] gracefully written history . . . the most authoritative account of this historical episode that is ever likely to be written.”—Michael Mandelbaum, American Purpose

“An important book.”—Jacob Heilbrunn, National Interest

“[A] complex and rich look at the arguments underpinning Russia’s present concern about NATO.”—Diplomatic Courier

“A riveting account of fateful choices to expand NATO and their consequences for relations with Russia today.”—Graham Allison, author of Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?

"Sarotte deftly unpacks one of the most important strategic moves of the post–Cold War Era: the decision to enlarge NATO. Her detailed history of the 1990s is groundbreaking, and her assessment of the impacts of NATO expansion on European security is balanced and nuanced. A major accomplishment and a must-read."—Charles A. Kupchan, Georgetown University and the Council on Foreign Relations

“Not One Inch will be considered the best-documented and best-argued history of the NATO expansion during the crucial 1989–1999 period.”—Norman Naimark, author of Stalin and the Fate of Europe: The Postwar Struggle for Sovereignty
 

“Sarotte explores how and why NATO expanded and relations with Russia deteriorated in the post–Cold War world. It is an important book, well documented and told."—Joseph Nye Jr., author of Do Morals Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump 

“Mary Sarotte’s insightful story of NATO’s enlargement in the 1990s will be the foundation for debates about lessons among policy-makers as well as a fascinating read for people interested in recent history.”—Robert B. Zoellick, US negotiator for German unification and author of America in the World: A History of U.S. Diplomacy and Foreign Policy 

 --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.

About the Author

M. E. Sarotte is the Kravis Professor of Historical Studies at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, and the author, among other books, of The Collapse: The Accidental Opening of the Berlin Wall. --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.

Product details

  • ASIN ‏ : ‎ B09KVLG4ST
  • Publisher ‏ : ‎ Yale University Press (November 30, 2021)
  • Publication date ‏ : ‎ November 30, 2021
  • Language ‏ : ‎ English
  • File size ‏ : ‎ 9028 KB
  • Text-to-Speech ‏ : ‎ Enabled
  • Enhanced typesetting ‏ : ‎ Enabled
  • X-Ray ‏ : ‎ Enabled
  • Word Wise ‏ : ‎ Enabled
  • Sticky notes ‏ : ‎ On Kindle Scribe
  • Print length ‏ : ‎ 567 pages
  • Page numbers source ISBN ‏ : ‎ 030025993X
  • Customer Reviews:
    4.7 4.7 out of 5 stars 373 ratings

About the authors

Follow authors to get new release updates, plus improved recommendations.
Previous page
  1. Mary E. Sarotte

    Mary E. Sarotte

    Brief content visible, double tap to read full content.
    Full content visible, double tap to read brief content.

    Sarotte is the author, among other books, of THE COLLAPSE and 1989, both of which were named Financial Times Books of the Year. Thirty years after the Soviet Union’s collapse, her newest book, NOT ONE INCH, reveals how tensions between America, NATO, and Russia transformed geopolitics between the Cold War and COVID.

    See more on the author's page
  2. M. E. Sarotte

    M. E. Sarotte

    Brief content visible, double tap to read full content.
    Full content visible, double tap to read brief content.

    Sarotte is the author, among other books, of THE COLLAPSE and 1989, both of which were named Financial Times Books of the Year. Thirty years after the Soviet Union’s collapse, her newest book, NOT ONE INCH, reveals how tensions between America, NATO, and Russia transformed geopolitics between the Cold War and COVID.

    See more on the author's page
Next page

Customer reviews

4.7 out of 5 stars
4.7 out of 5
373 global ratings

Top reviews from the United States

Rognvaldur Hannesson
5.0 out of 5 stars The roots of the war in Ukraine are long and twisted
Reviewed in the United States on February 24, 2023
Verified Purchase
«Not one inch» is the title of a book by Yale professor Mary E. Sarotte. It comes from a question the then secretary of State James Baker put to Gorbachev on February 9, 1990:
“Would you prefer to see a unified Germany outside of NATO, independent and with no US forces, or would you prefer a unified Germany to be tied to NATO, with assurances that NATO jurisdiction would not shift one inch eastward from its present position?”
How different the world was then. The Soviet Union, with hindsight then in its death throws, still had to be consulted about the unification of Germany, let alone expansion of NATO to the previous sphere of influence of the Soviet Union.
The book is well written; I read it almost like a thriller. It covers the period from the fall of the Berlin wall to 1999, when the opportunities of a close cooperation between Russia and the US-dominated world had all but faded. I, who lived through all these years and followed the news reasonably well, am struck by how little I knew, but then I didn’t have access to all the archives that professor Sarotte has managed to pry open to study all the secret notes and documents from this period.
The book makes it abundantly clear that the roots of the war in Ukraine are long and twisted. Would a more accommodating and cooperative attitude by the US to Russia have managed to avoid it? Is the eastward expansion of NATO the direct cause of the present war? Professor Sarotte apparently has much sympathy for that hypothesis, even if she doesn’t say so directly, and would probably be the first to acknowledge that such counterfactuals can never be proven.
But there is another possibility which she also allows for, even if with less emphasis. Was Russia, sooner or later, bound to act aggressively to dominate its neighbors, simply because of its size, history and power, the latter even encompassing the ultimate, nuclear weapons? It is, to say the least, understandable that the previous Soviet satellites and the Baltic states tried everything they could to get NATO security guarantees as soon as possible. They knew from their own experience what Russian domination means. A more surprising fact is how eager successive American presidents were in providing those guarantees. Nobody knows better than the Americans themselves that without them NATO would not even deserve to be called a paper tiger. So much is clear from the present war in Ukraine; the military aid the Americans have provided dwarfs all else.
Professor Sarotte’s book is not just a great read, it is a thoroughly scholarly work, well illustrated by the fact that almost half of the book is endnotes! The general reader who buys the hardcover edition will end up with a lot of pages he’ll never flip, but that is a minor inconvenience.
5 people found this helpful
Helpful
 Report
Patrick D. Gallaugher, Jr.
5.0 out of 5 stars Important backdrop to the Ukrainian Crisis
Reviewed in the United States on May 4, 2022
Verified Purchase
In February, 1990, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker met with Mikhail Gorbachev, leader of the Soviet Union, to discuss a topic that, even a year earlier, would have been considered a pipe dream: reunification of East and West Germany. Gorbachev, a staunch Communist but also a naïve idealist whose grip on power was slipping, was willing to discuss German reunification but had one principal concern. If the USSR agreed to reunification of Germany, would NATO expand and post troops or station nuclear weapons in this former Soviet sphere of influence? Baker proposed a hypothetical bargain: what if, in return for the USSR agreeing to German unification, NATO would agree “not [to] shift one inch eastward from its present position?”

President George H.W. Bush disagreed with and quickly sought to disown and deemphasize Baker’s suggestion, and U.S. negotiators took pains not to recognize it as an explicit condition of German reunification. In return for a massive economic assistance package from West Germany, the USSR agreed to German reunification, removing hundreds of thousands of its troops from East Germany. The vaguely-worded German reunification agreement did not make it clear that NATO could never expand. But Gorbachev and other Soviet officials later claimed they agreed to reunification based on an understanding that NATO would not expand.

In late 1991, Gorbachev completely lost control as the USSR suddenly collapsed and dissolved, breaking up into its constituent parts including Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. Boris Yeltsin, an alcoholic populist and non-Communist, was elected president of Russia. He forged a close friendship with U.S. President Bill Clinton and helped usher in a remarkable era of cooperation between the U.S. and Russia. The two countries reduced stockpiles of nuclear weapons, “de-targeted” ballistic missiles aimed at each other’s cities, and sent troops to serve alongside each other in a Bosnian peace-keeping mission. A primary U.S. goal at this time was persuading former Warsaw Pact and USSR territories—including Ukraine—to return tens of thousands of nuclear weapons to Russia, to prevent de facto creation of a dozen new nuclear nations and prevent sale of weapons on the black market. The U.S. engaged in considerable arm-twisting to persuade Ukraine to return thousands of nuclear weapons to Russia, assuaging Ukrainian concerns about future Russian aggression by agreeing to help preserve (but not “guaranty”) Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

That era of U.S./Russian cooperation is only a distant memory today as the U.S. and Russia seem close to war in the wake of Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine. In her detailed and informative book, Not One Inch: America, Russia, and the Making of Post-Cold War Stalemate, M. E. Sarotte, who teaches at John Hopkins and serves on the Council on Foreign Relations, analyzes the missteps and missed opportunities that led to the collapse of relations between the U.S. and Russia.

With the demise of the USSR, over a dozen countries and territories in Central and Eastern Europe that had suffered under Soviet or Russian domination suddenly won independence. They immediately began clamoring for admission into NATO, to obtain the benefit of its Article-5 protection before the “bad bear” of Russian imperialism had a chance to re-emerge. Yeltsin did not help calm fears when he invaded Chechnya, where Russian troops committed atrocities similar to those inflicted on Ukrainians today. The Clinton administration initially prioritized good relations with Russia and the opportunity for historic reductions in the countries’ nuclear arms. But with the collapse of the USSR, members of the U.S. state and foreign service departments (along with counterparts in other NATO countries) saw another historic opportunity—to expand NATO into former Warsaw Pact countries and protect them from future Russian imperialism.

Despite fierce opposition from a Russia too weak at the time to stop it from happening, in 1996 Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic were invited to join NATO. Soon thereafter, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia were invited to seek membership. This shifted the old Cold War dividing line many Russians viewed as an important buffer zone (won at great cost in the Second World War) against possible future invasions like those of Napoleon and Hitler—to the borders of Russia. These Russian leaders—who included a former mid-level KGB agent named Vladimir Putin—were resentful and felt the West had taken advantage of Russia in a time of economic and military weakness. “[O]ne day,” warned French President Jacques Chirac, “there will be dangerous nationalist backlash.” British foreign secretary Malcolm Rifkind warned of another potential problem: “[O]ne should not enter into solemn treaty obligations involving a potential declaration of war . . . based simply on an assumption that one would never be called upon to honor such obligations.”

On the other hand, those who supported NATO's quick expansion might argue that Russia's actions in Ukraine entirely justifies that expansion.

In any event, this is an excellent read for anyone interested in the detailed history of how the current Ukrainian crisis arose.
20 people found this helpful
Helpful
 Report

Top reviews from other countries

Translate all reviews to English
URK
5.0 out of 5 stars Please read you will learn more than you imagine you could
Reviewed in Canada on March 28, 2023
Verified Purchase
If you think you know what happened you will learn much more and become to understand why and how it happened. This is a book you simply can not not read.
Report
Paradesi K.Yarikipati
5.0 out of 5 stars How Gorbachev cheated by the West
Reviewed in India on September 22, 2023
Verified Purchase
The Book is about the events before and after the fall of Berlin Wall and the promises made and agreements reached between the USSR and the West for reunification of Germany..The West is agreed to not to expand NATO one inch towards the East ..but mischievously skipped the promise in agreement..in other words Gorbachev was cheated..and NATO was expanded to the borders of Russia..the meek submission to the west by Gorbachev ultimately lead to August coup of 1991 and fall of USSR..Well researched and must read...
Report
Millan
5.0 out of 5 stars Insightful research on 1990s relationship of the West with Russia
Reviewed in the United Kingdom on April 23, 2022
Verified Purchase
“How we got here” could have been the title of the book. The invasion of Ukraine by Russia did not come really out of the blue. The book which is extremely well researched shows the events of the 1990s sowed the seeds of rising tension between the West and Russia that Putin has chosen to exploit. The author sets out the history without pushing an agenda leaving the reader to make up his own mind. Definitely a must read book.
9 people found this helpful
 Report
Amazon Kunde
5.0 out of 5 stars Der Titel hält was er verspricht
Reviewed in Germany on February 26, 2022
Verified Purchase
alles, zur Info
4 people found this helpful
 Report
michel paradis
5.0 out of 5 stars Très bonne recherche pertinente
Reviewed in Canada on February 27, 2022
Verified Purchase
Le sujet est d actualité
Report
Report an issue

Does this item contain inappropriate content?
Report
Do you believe that this item violates a copyright?
Report
Does this item contain quality or formatting issues?
Report